PILOT PROJECT AT BIHAR REGIMENT AT SALTLAKE.

FORCE PROTECTION AND ORGANIC INT CAPABILITY. ( MI Bn, Bn Int Sec ,CLIC)

Cleared by Gen. V. K. Singh (Retd.) and for Preview by G-O-C-in-C, HQEC.

Tactical units engage in combat with intelligence inputs coming from the MI dep’t from higher echelons. In today’s asymmetric war scenario the Company-level units should also have its own organic intelligence structures with very few personnel and assets deployed. They can act on available intelligence from the ground themselves without having to wait for collected, collated, analyzed information from Brigade Int section or other agencies which takes time—add to it the dissemination delays. In addition to conducting mission specific analysis and kinetic or non kinetic attack, the Company-level unit can also disseminate the intelligence acquired to subordinate units, parallel units or higher headquarters as these intelligence inputs may be useful to these parties as often intelligence about the enemy in one area of operations can help units in other operational areas, the enemy may be adopting similar tactics or other behavioral factors.

It is very important to recognize the lack of an intelligence structure at Company-level levels. The Company-level unit should have collection and analytical capabilities. There have been instances of lethal attacks on camps and bases itself-a force protection problem. We just cannot depend entirely on civil police and other intelligence agencies to supply us intelligence about the threat which usually is biased, and influenced by political and regional faction influences. The soldier on the ground who is a part of say the Infantry battalion engaging the insurgents , is face to face with the reality—the enemy , the local population and other parties of interest. Say during a reconnaissance patrol his team may come across a valuable source. After rapidly dismounting and ensuring he has no weapons, the teams intelligence component can start source cops like

Company-level or platoon level questioning, debriefing, etc and if a counterintelligence agent is also present the more the better for HUMINT collection.

Let us assume a Command (set up for COIN ops, or Antiterrorist ops in a State) which has everything in order such as Command chain, combat machinery, defined communication channels, civil administration support and police, civil intelligence agencies support lacks only an organic intelligence unit and depends on Higher HQ such as Battalion intelligence section and civil agencies for intelligence information.

It should be noted here that the necessary information is requisitioned first in the form of Request of Information document, which will go through various processing nodes as characterized by administrative channels, then finally landing in the collection manager’s hands from the requested agencies higher authority to whom the request was directed. Now the collection manager will access already present records database and national databases to explore if the needed information is already available—if so he further initiates request for information, gets the information and passes it on to the commander of the unit. If not available he prioritizes the requested information as per the supported commands requirements, evaluates availability of suitable assets, allocates the assets tasking as per their capabilities, capacity and speciality,the assets  are deployed, information collected, again sent up channels for evaluation of information quality , credibility (if source-submitted),analyzed, transformed into intelligence product and then finally disseminated to the supported commands commander.

All the above processes takes time, sometimes very long time, rendering the information useless as intelligence can at times be highly perishable, especially combat intelligence. The commander needs actionable intelligence fast and to enable this it would be far better if he himself has an organic modular intelligence unit, ready to take up assignments, if needed be integrated with the strike platoons itself for much faster information gathering and analysis and immediate action by the platoon commander. Company level/Platoon level intelligence capability can tremendously increase the competitive edge of the commander over the enemy, increase his situational awareness and be a force enabler.

Doctrine, Personnel, Training and Education, Leadership, Materiel Development, Organization, and Soldier Systems needs to be reviewed if intelligence assets need to be pushed down to the lowest level. There are dozens of units deployed in Company-level operations on the battlefield. If they are intelligence capable the Commander will get the best up-to-date and regularly updated(in the fluid war scenario of rapidly changing ground situations) intelligence inputs thus heightening his situational understanding immensely and thus giving him that decisive competitive edge over the enemy.

The need for projected intelligence capability is all the more important if the commander has to deploy to an unfamiliar area ,inhabited by an asymmetric threat which unlike a conventional enemy has no defined order of battle,organization,discernible patterns ,does not employ standard military tactics and where ops may be simultaneous , non-linear and distributed. In such a situation the commander needs to project his force by sending in interim combat enabled (for self defense) reconnaissance teams who have intelligence gathering ability as well as counterintelligence asset , not the usual reconnaissance and surveillance patrols who are composed only of scouts and which do not answer the ‘’why’’ of things observed.

Today we are facing an enemy which is very unlike conventional adversaries who can be identified using intelligence as to their leadership,TOE,order of battle,strength,dispositions or anything which is determined by set doctrinal military tactics, techniques and procedures.Todays enemy in low intensity warfare is asymmetric in nature, taking refuge among the urban or rural community who act as enablers of the insurgent movement wither wholly or partially depending on the degree of acceptance of insurgent ideology and insurgent leaderships always try to influence the local communities to the maximum as they are well aware of the benefits of sanctuary among the latter. The enemy recruits, rests and reinforces/resupply itself from amongst the population. Here intelligence directly focused on the enemy is difficult in practice; the enemy is elusive, deceptive and resorts to unconventional attack modes and very adaptable but the enemy’s source of sustenance and very survival depends a great deal on the local populations support. The company and platoon sized units need immediate on scene intelligence support to deal with such a population enabled asymmetric enemy. As such even the smallest fighting unit must be capable of intense collection and analysis of information to get actionable intelligence instead of waiting for intelligence from higher headquarters which may entail time thus letting go of opportunities in combat. It is always not realistic to depend on higher echelon staff for intelligence. We must have an inbuilt intelligence capability in the smallest unit on the ground. The main criteria here is to shorten considerably the time between deciding on intelligence priorities ,detecting the enemy’s OB,Strength,disposition,capabilities and T&OE ,delivering the attack sequence and assessing the Battle damage and re-strike options.

COIN targeting necessitates overwhelming intelligence from ‘’bottom-up’ for successful kinetic/non-kinetic operations. Hence ground level units need to be trained and tasked with intelligence collection. It is near impossible to dedicate the very few specialized intelligence assets to all the operating forces in the area of operations. Here are the key challenges of bottom- up collections:

(1)Determining what is important information. Leaders need to determine PIRs for each mission.

(2)Determining where to start – in terms of information or geography. Based upon key terrain (human and/or geographic).

Conventional operations and COIN/Antiterrorist operations (This can be termed operation against networked criminal enterprises) are different in that the intelligence preparation of the battle space takes into consideration not only threat elements but also the human terrain—that is the local population. Unlike kinetic attack priority in conventional operations (kill/capture) in COIN operations non-kinetic attack modes are often the desired outcome – non-kinetic attacks taking into account civilian community heads, population psychological operations, insurgent targets social network, targeting his social contacts to judge his resultant movements and tracking him to finally locate his cell members or leadership, exploitation of targets other community traits—in effect besides personality targeting we are also concerned with the fact (non-kinetic fires) that units must project the second and third order of effects after they mount any operation. Operations on a population, with which the targeted individual interacts, may have second and third order effects on that targeted individual (e.g. – he may increase communications or flee the area—in the former case SIGINT intercepts can yield a lot of information about his immediate network , if his communications are verbal and physical meet ups surveillance will be the preferred tool whereas in the latter case if he flees the area he can be tracked to know his sanctuary—he is bound to contact his team members , move in their hideouts.).All in all kinetic attack fires can yield much more intelligence than just by acquiring battle order intelligence. Only resorting to kinetic fires of kill/capture can never solve an insurgency problem., As the soldiers on the ground are those who are frequently in direct contact with community members (and hence those of them who are affiliates/sympathizers/facilitators of the insurgents) they have the best opportunity to gain intelligence information by conducting tactical questioning (patrols, checkpoints, choke points) or by casual elicitation methods in normal scenarios.

Later it will be shown that setting up a company level intelligence cell and enabling tactical teams with intelligence assets gives a major thrust in intelligence collection and also counterintelligence activities.

There needs to be a change in focus of effort between command levels.

1)Stress should be given to the fact that tactical company and platoon level units conduct operations with a high degree of success and hence higher levels of command must push intelligence staff and information down to lowest points of collection (initial points) , that is the company/battalion levels.

2)at the same time low density high demand ISR assets need to be stretched and spread across the area of operations to gain a better situational understanding.

With these two initiatives the Command Headquarters will not lose control over its intelligence assets and will neither lose the privilege of gaining situational understanding exclusively. On the contrary it will be able to gain more accurate intelligence inputs. Till so far the intelligence needs of individual ground units or any feedback from them was generally ignored what with the Battalion intelligence officer forwarding the intelligence summary report to higher headquarters with the overall intelligence picture of the area of operations falling under the Battalions jurisdiction.

REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AT UNIT/PLATOON LEVEL:

It is near impossible to allocate specialized intelligence assets to every operating force in the Area of Ops as such assets are few in number and the fact that majority of the information required for targeting flows ‘’bottom-up’ (that is the lowest level troops) necessitates the creation of intelligence collection units at troop level either organic to the tactical combat ground unit or as a modular unit capable of plugging into any company or unit as per requirements. This fact should be taken seriously into Staff consideration for targeting, particularly in asymmetric type warfare where the network must be targeted and where delivery of fire-power is dependent on very specific intelligence.

Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) drive the military intelligence collection process.

While military intelligence officers help in developing intelligence requirements, it is the commander who is responsible for designating an intelligence requirement as a priority. The intelligence staff regularly updates the commander on its progress toward answering each PIR.speaking, that a military intelligence officer (STAFF INT OFFICER) and his staff are tasked with answering.

Additional intelligence requirements aimed at filling gaps in commanders’ understanding of the operating environment and requests for information may come from higher echelons, lower echelons, and lateral organizations, or from the intelligence staff itself, but it is the PIRs that an STAFF INT OFFICER has been tasked with that are most important.

While emphasis shifts in various doctrinal publications, PIRs are generally supposed to:

1.Ask a single question.

2.Be ranked in importance.

3.Be specific: Focus on a specific event, fact or activity.

4.Be tied to a single decision or planning task the commander has to make.

5.Provide a last time by which information is of value (LTIOV).

6.Be answerable using available assets and capabilities.

Usually, a commander only designates three to five intelligence requirements as PIRs at any one time.

The PIR model makes use of intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing models that gained traction in combating crime in the United States after 11 September 2001 by refining them for practical use within the military dynamic. The recce unit along with the embedded HUMINT /CI element conducts area reconnaissance and community operations involving atmospherics, thus establishing a PIR framework before resorting to tactical questioning, elicitation and interrogation by using the PIRs to force conversations, gain community perspective and prepare engagement summaries for analysis...The engagement summaries are analyzed, community feedbacks are compiled thus highlighting the causes that aid insurgency, enabling the unit in turn to recommend the targets that are the driving causes of the insurgency.

We can have an integral organic intelligence capability at the Battalion level:

The Bn Intelligence section will consist of the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO , 2 havildars and 6 infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will interface between the companies and the Bde.The companies pass on intelligence information for processing to the Bn Intelligence section who in turn passes them on to the Bde and also as per ground requirements from the companies and Bn staff .The Bn intelligence section will develop sources and contacts from among the local population and liaise with the civil police and intelligence agencies. The question of deconfliction arises at this stage as the line companies and platoons have their sources , contacts and liaisons as well as the civil agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section to deconflict its sources with all these sources, contacts and liaisons. The Bn intelligence section will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect weapons/explosives caches, collect incriminating evidentiary information for prosecution by the civil agencies and increase the overall situational understanding of the Bn and Bde commanders and staff. Delineation of sources between the Bn , the line companies , the platoons and the HUMINT units is very important by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with respect to the sources. We can have contacts like community leaders of influence , local politicians and councilors , surface and witting contacts as well as those contacts who are very useful , can supply information of rich intelligence value but need protection which will be the responsibility of the HUMINT units. The overt contacts like the community leaders etc can be the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section while the surface contacts and liaison can be given to the line units and platoons. The same line units and platoons can forward to HUMINT units any source of HUMINT interest which they come across community operations , patrolling or tactical operations.

Just like the Staff composition at Division level we can create similar structure at the Divn Bn level. There will be an Ops Staff officer and an Intelligence Staff officer. Compared to the Ops Staff officer the Int Staff officer, by virtue of his direct contact with the Div Staff Officer is better aware of all Div intelligence requirements, prioritized or otherwise and which requirements are tasked to subordinate units. His duties include analyzing collected information by Bn Int Section and effect the transfer of intelligence laterally and vertically, laterally to adjacent units , higher headquarters , line companies and even to the line platoon base camps. The Ops Staff officer will see to the tasking of Div intelligence requirements to all subordinate units.

To further push down the intelligence capability to the line companies’ level and platoon level , we can assign 2 NCOs at each line company and one soldier to take over as intelligence representative and co-located at the platoon level. During patrolling , reconnaissance by the Company soldiers , platoon soldiers , all collected information will be filtered , categorized and forwarded to the Bn Intelligence section for analysis and dissemination laterally and to higher headquarters. The intelligence soldiers at Company and Platoon levels can also requisition intelligence and imagery information from higher headquarters.

Secondary Collectors:

HUMINT collection is not limited only to HUMINT personnel. These can be termed primary collectors.HUMINT can also be and is collected (sometimes unknowingly and never reported) by secondary collectors like military police , troops and civil affairs personnel.

Take a scenario. A soldier comes across a man who offers information which the soldier feels could be of use to the HUMINT people. He does not bring the source in focus by detaining him or questioning him before others. He stays friendly , eliciting as much as possible after the source finishes his narration. He does all this discreetly. He manages to record the details of the source and when he is back from the check post to his camp he discreetly meets the Bn Int section officer and fills him up with all the information he has gathered.Thereafter one and only one soldier in the Bn Int section passes on the information to the HUMINT operative with the contact details of the source.

In a second scenario the soldier may come across something , say a weapons cache , which he recognizes , and this exploitable intelligence he again passes on to the Bn Int section discreetly. In both cases he won’t tell his colleagues or anyone. Thus we find line soldiers and other secondary collectors, if they keep their eyes and ears open, can create a good surface contacts base , thus reducing the workload on primary HUMINT collectors by gathering exploitable intelligence , the primary collectors can now focus on more important issues like prioritized intelligence requirements of the Commander. If all or many of the line soldiers or other secondary collectors work in this fashion the surface contacts base grows phenomenally, thus creating a secondary source base. Thus we achieve synchronization between primary and secondary collectors. The fact that the soldier does not tell any of his colleagues or even the chain of command renders the information to be exploited and away from any technical or influence detractors by limiting the sphere of knowledge. Further it is possible that any primary source may have links with the individual dealing with the secondary collector or any other link and this can be of value to the primary HUMINT collectors. Hence the bottom-line should be personal contact and liaison with the local community for every patrolling member.

Mission Responsibilities of commanders (with regard to soldiers who are not intelligence personnel, but come across information on tactical questioning—secondary collectors):

Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy Leader:

Patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints, convoys—all these come into contact with enemy personnel (captured), civilians, civil suspects/detainees and criminal elements who can be subjected to tactical questioning. Hence the mission is to train the involved personnel in tactical questioning and integrate it in the planning and preparation/execution of the said activities. Pursuant to this prepare for debriefing after all personnel of patrols etc report to the unit intelligence officer

Prepare reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on any observations or information extracted after tactical questioning including being able to recognize any information of so much importance(combat intelligence) that it must be reported immediately without delay.

During such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all EPW/Detainee and seized documents must be subjected to exploitation carefully as these are prime sources of intelligence.

All the above should be predicated by the Unit intelligence officers tasking of prioritized intelligence requirements but collection outside these should not be ignored if such information is delivered by the source concerned. They might be of tactical value to the Commander or HUMINT officers.

Platoon Leader:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

Instruct and see to it that it is followed to the book that all personnel returning from patrolling, manning checkpoints, convoys etc report everything and get subjected to full debriefing.

Highlight before them the high importance of submitting information of immediate tactical value without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is mandatory. To this effect he should apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the battalion intelligence staff in this regard.

Company/Troop/Battery Commander:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

All intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in patrolling and tasked with collection are reviewed and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde staff. While doing this highlight that information that is linked to the current operations or the AO environment.

Make it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in keeping with the procedures laid down by higher headquarters intelligence staff.

Ensure that everyone understands that it is mandatory to report information IMMEDIATELY of critical value.

Battalion STAFF INT OFFICER and S3 Sections:

Task the company, section, squad commanders on intelligence requirements and guide them through the Staff headquarters.

Push down intelligence information to these command levels so as to enable them to get a better situational understanding and know what is expected of them. Thus they will be able to frame tactical questions better.

See to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one is left out.

Establish procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

The fighting forces engaged directly with the enemy, companies and the platoons therein come into regular contact with the local communities, local administration, village heads and panchayats, and the enemy itself. The battalion may have its own intelligence section and if it does the section is very understaffed with one intelligence officer and an aide. The troops depend wholly on brigade intelligence inputs and intelligence feeds from other agencies. These inputs come as a result for requests for information from the ground and the process of requesting, tasking the request to brigade intelligence personnel, gathering the intelligence using collection platforms and pulling intelligence from adjacent headquarters, units and from national agencies and finally pushing it down to the combat team all takes time resulting in untimely intelligence feeds. Add to this the total lack of first hand contact of Brigade level intelligence section with the human and enemy terrain of the area of operations (human terrain is the local population) which is enjoyed by the troops on the ground fully. This lack of contact leads to low level of situational understanding of the higher headquarters and whatever intelligence they gather is based on standard TTPs and intelligence sharing with other agencies. Yes certain cases involve infiltration by HUMINT/CI assets but as this is fraught with dangers and requires highly talented agents adept in deception and which is lacking in our intelligence headquarters intelligence acquisition using infiltration is scarce e are now left with the human terrain, the local populace and higher headquarters intelligence personnel will not commit to regular interaction with them like the soldiers on the ground do during patrols or securing an area after an operation or mopping up operations or during a cordon/search operation. Higher commands are not fully meeting their intelligence requirements of the companies and platoons in a timely manner; nor at the level of detail necessary for company commanders to successfully operate in the asymmetric defined battlespace.The company and platoon commanders must be able to portray the threat and disposition accurately nominate targets-both for kinetic and non- kinetic attacks and conduct successfully battle damage assessments so that the option of restrike does not get overlooked for example. For this is required a company level intelligence cell and pushing down further an intelligence enabled platoon. The infantry company requires and organic capability to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to increase their operational effectiveness in full spectrum conflict. Infantry units require company level intelligence cells (CLIC) specifically organized, trained, and equipped to address this capability gap.

Each company (and in many cases several platoons) are assigned their own Area of Ops where the company level intelligence team or platoon level intelligence cell conduct intelligence collection activities and proper synchronization of ISR and integrating with the targeting process is invariably attained as all round collection involving the soldiers who are now the sensors leads to a far better situational understanding.

Primary tasks: Threat situation and disposition, Target nomination, BDA,Combat/security operations, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.

The troops fighting on the ground are fed intelligence from Brigade level intelligence HQ.There are certain limitations which must be taken cognizant as well as the offered solutions ( points 1,6 , highlight the need for company level intelligence structure)

Your intelligence system has some limitations you must understand. These include-

1.Dissemination of information is highly dependent on communications systems and architecture and these are usually limited and under constraints in different fighting environments. Often requests for information from ground units are not disseminated in time. Accurate, timely and specific actionable intelligence is necessary to drive operations with that distinctive competitive edge and this is usually lacking.

2.Single-source collection is susceptible to adversary control and deception.Muliple sources need to be deployed and multidisciplinary intelligence collection platforms should be employed.

3.Counterinsurgency operations may be affected if the enemy resorts to non-usage of communications/no communications equipment (to avoid getting intercepted or DF’d) thus affecting adversely COMINT and ELINT based intelligence collection. Thus our intelligence collection effort gets degraded by the enemy.

4.Weather degradation of traffic ability and the negative effects of high winds on antenna arrays and aviation collection and jamming systems.

5.Inability of ground-based systems to operate on the move. Positioning and integration of mutually supporting ground and airborne systems is critical to continuous support.

6.Lack of sufficient organic intelligence assets to satisfy all your intelligence requirements.

Current asymmetric intelligence collection is the primary means to combat insurgency successfully by gaining a thorough situational understanding and developing first hand combat intelligence. This tactical environment needs our fighting troops to be trained in tactical intelligence collection to deal with an asymmetric enemy.

When a battalion is deployed, and usually stability and support operations are at battalion level we usually see that the battalion itself rarely executes its operation as a single unit. It devolves into sub-divisions which take up strategic areas in the overall area of operations. Detached posts/stations are set up in these strategic areas and these posts /sections create and maintain unit intelligence cells engaged in tactical intelligence collection on the enemy. Each garrison unit engages in low level source operations using standard intelligence collection methods, and getting a feel of communication routes,locational economics, topography and geography, human terrain intelligence and the political forces operating in the community together with any other criminal enterprises working hand in hand with the insurgent elements.

INTELLIGENCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY

After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of the enemy.

Without sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic intelligence assets.

The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.

The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINT collectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's collection plan.

Military Intelligence Brigade

Military intelligence brigades coordinate, manage, and direct intelligence and surveillance; they conduct collection management, all-source intelligence analysis, production; and they disseminate information in support of national, joint, interagency, multi-national, regional combatant command, and Army service component requirements.

Each BRIGADE: ---4-5 SUBORDINATE MI BNS.

Brigade designated combat team has striker team with HUMINT and CI capability in addition to R&S assets.

Brigade headquarters

Ops Bn,

Aerial exploitation/reconnaissance Bn

Fwd collection Bn(CI/HUMINT) ,

Fwd collection Bn (SIGINT),

Comm. Bn.

And electronics Bn,

Figure 1: Bn Level Int Platoon comprising of Company level intelligence units

PUSHING DOWN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY FROM BRIGADE LEVEL

OPTION A: Military Intelligence (Ml) Battalion

The MI Bn provides a focused approach for Bde Int staff as it is a fully contained organization with specialized companies, the CI Company, the C&E Company and the I&E company. All these companies provide a better situational understanding of the Bde Commander by providing support to HUMINT, (Tactical HUMINT teams), conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield, interrogation and document/equipment exploitation operations, support to targeting and battle damage assessment/restrike options, developing threat disposition estimate. The Companies further have MI enabled platoons which on account of being near the ground can collect and provide timely threat intelligence data. Each platoon may be specialized in its own way; one can be a tactical HUMINT platoon , HUMINT platoon, one an ISR analysis platoon all being controlled by the Company headquarters element which also interfaces with the Company

commander and staff and laterally with the other specialty MI companies under the MI Bn.Fusing of intelligence data from the platoons and lateral companies with those that are pushed down from higher HQ on requisition gives a far better threat assessment. Ultimately combat intelligence, target information and otrher satisfied priority intelligence requirements are at the hands of the Commander for necessary action.

The MI company in support provides-

Communications intercept, direction finding (DF), and ECM.

CI.

Interrogation.

Ground surveillance.

Personnel to staff the Intelligence Section, These soldiers conduct-

-Collection Management.

-All-source analysis and reporting.

-Dissemination.

-Technical control and tasking.

-Multidiscipline force protection and OPSEC support.

 The TEB Unit provides

1.CI

2.interrogation of prisoners

3.ground-based SIGINT and EW support

4.and LRS support to corps operations

COMPANY LEVEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT:

Organization

The MI cell (C& E), shown at Figure 2, is organized into a headquarters section, an MI unit (CI), an MI unit (interrogation and exploitation), and an MI unit (collection and exploitation). Headquarters section provides C2, administrative services, and logistic support for units of the company.

Roles and Functions

The Collection and Exploitation section provides interrogation and CI support. Functions , include:

Setting up interrogation centers and executing interrogation operations of enemy prisoners of war.

Determine enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat, analyze it and recommend countermeasures, both on the passive defensive side as well as offensive methods.

Conduct exploitation of turned enemy agents. Conduct polygraph techniques and technical operations.

Conduct DOCEX

Conduct debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from captivity,detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.

Conduct Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO).

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT (CI)

Mission

"The mission of the MI Unit (CI) is to conduct CI operations and multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) threat analysis in support of the Commanders intelligence requirements’’.

Organization

The MI Unit (CI) will be composed of a section HQ, an Ops section, and CI platoon.

Roles and Functions

Provides C-HUMINT support

Conducts Vulnerability assessment

Supports OPSEC

Supports targeting , nominates HVT

Conducts CI investigations

Conducts Counterintelligence FP Source Operations

Conducts counterespionage,countersubversion and counter sabotage operations.

Liaises with other intelligence agencies

Conducts offensive operations during wartime Areas of interest:

Known or suspected acts of treason,sedition,espionage by Army personnel

Known or suspected association with elements of threat intelligence

Terrorism, assassination incidents

Defections and unexplained absence of Army personnel

People impersonating as military intelligence personnel.

MI UNIT (INTERROGATION AND EXPLOITATION I&E) Mission

"The mission of the MI Unit (Interrogation and Exploitation) is to conduct interrogation of enemy prisoners of war EPW,debriefing of persons having information of intelligence value and exploitation of captured documents,media and hardware.”

Organization

The MI Unit (Interrogation and Exploitation) consists of a HQ section,an Ops section,communications section and I&E platoon.

Roles and Functions

 Setting up interrogation facilities during wartime

Interrogation of EPWs.Establishment of a joint or combined interrogation facility and conduct interrogations of EPWs. Conduct debriefings of high level political and military personnel, civilian internees,refugees, displaced persons, and other non- US personnel.

Conduct debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from captivity,detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.

Conducts DOCEX,and translation of captured documents.Translate and exploit documents acquired, found, or captured in the theater AO.

Debrief US and Allied personnel having escaped after being captured or having evaded capture.

MI UNIT (COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION C&E)

The above two units, viz MI (CI) and MI(I&E) are combined into one UNIT , collection and exploitation MI(C&E) and hence executes all the functions which are inherent in the 2 units. This is a modular unit, can hence plug as a detachment support into any Battalion/Company which requires CI/HUMINT support but does not require a full intelligence battalion /Company expertise. It can also be situation may not allow the deployment of full intelligence assets –in such a case the MI(C&E) can be scaled and tailored to suit the requirements of the Battalion. This unit can pull operatives from both the MI (CI) and MI (I&E) to create CI and I&E platoons to conduct tactical HUMINT (CI/HUMINT) missions with the available CI, collection, and exploitation and interrogation expertise.

Mission

"The collection and exploitation unit collects intelligence information through the acquisition, training, briefing and debriefing of HUMINT assets in support of Army requirements and provides CI support within the area of operations, conducts interrogations of prisoners of war and other personnel of intelligence interest; translates and exploits selected foreign documents/ media; and exploits foreign materiel of intelligence interest."

Organization

The MI Unit (Collection and Exploitation) consists of a section headquarters, CI operations section, interrogation operations section, and counterintelligence and I & E platoons.

Roles and Functions

Provides C-HUMINT support

Conducts Vulnerability assessment

Supports OPSEC

Supports targeting , nominates HVT

Conducts CI investigations

Conducts Counterintelligence FP Source Operations

Conducts counterespionage,countersubversion and counter sabotage operations.

Liaises with other intelligence agencies

Conducts offensive operations during wartime

Areas of interest:

Known or suspected acts of treason,sedition,espionage by Army personnel

Known or suspected association with elements of threat intelligence

Terrorism, assassination incidents

Defections and unexplained absence of Army personnel

People impersonating as military intelligence personnel.

Setting up interrogation facilities during wartime

Interrogation of EPWs.Establishment of a joint or combined interrogation facility and conduct interrogations of EPWs. Conduct debriefings of high level political and military personnel, civilian internees,refugees, displaced persons, and other non- US personnel.

Conduct debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from captivity,detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.

Conducts DOCEX,and translation of captured documents.Translate and exploit documents acquired, found, or captured in the theater AO.

Debrief US and Allied personnel having escaped after being captured or having evaded capture.

Areas of interest:

Known or suspected acts of treason,sedition,espionage by Army personnel

Known or suspected association with elements of threat intelligence

Terrorism,assassination incidents

Defections and unexplained absence of Army personnel

People impersonating as military intelligence personnel.

OPTION  B :BLIP/CLIC

Under the command and supervision of the Inf Bn STAFF INT OFFICER Int officer intelligence platoons can be created. From among the Bn soldiers according to capability, availability and performance should be selected.

There will be two echelons in each platoon.

SECTION A supports Bn HQ.The Bn Int HQ Section will be composed of one Int officer,one intelligence specialist of the rank of JCO, and 3 enlisted soldiers. The Int officer can serve both as staff officer for the Bn Command and also as Commander of the operating forces in the Company. He is responsible for analyzing intelligence and planning deployment and tactical employment of ISR assets. The intelligence specialist can be a ground recon specialist whose duties involve observe and report on enemy activity and other information of military importance in close operations.

(Close operations are operations that are within the commander's area of operation (AO) in his battle space . Most operations that are projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive actions. It requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and exploit success. Dominated by fire support, the combined elements of the ground and air elements conduct maneuver warfare to enhance the effects of their fires and their ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy’s ability to interfere with that maneuver.)

SECTION B is the CLIC.Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.)

Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.

The formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic intelligence unit which will provide him additional support apart from the intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher ups.Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bn conduct lateral communication , exchanging combat intelligence and other information, thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist helps in sustainment training ,the training a byproduct of the operations the soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn

Company Level Intelligence Cells

Coming to the CLIC level we have an organic capability to acquire combat intelligence directly at the ground level. Actionable intelligence is needed desperately by our fighting forces but the time delay from sensor to shooter(sensors on receipt of request for information collect the data matching given coordinates, pass it on to the intelligence section for interpretation who in turn sends it to his higher up for evaluation and dissemination to the ground unit; in case of map/imagery obtained by aerial surveillance the time delay is much more) is often so much that despite accurate target nomination the operation slips out of hand. With the CLIC at his disposal the commander now can obtain, analyse and act on readily available combat intelligence without having to wait for intelligence feeds.C2, intelligence and operations are hereby synchronized and integration achieved successfully. That too at the lowest level. The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC , collection and analysis and production are looked after by the officer in charge , usually a JCO and there will be two soldiers , one from each section to function as intelligence watch and are assigned to the company combat ops center.

Functions/responsibilities:

CLIC O-I-C: Reports to Company Comander,assists the watch officer in operations situation development (common tactical ops picture),managing and supervising CLIC ops,interacting with adjacent units , lower units and higher echelons and utilizing the intelligence flow.

If required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids.

After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of the enemy.

LRS units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and follow-on forces and deep targets. LRS units conduct stationary surveillance and very limited reconnaissance. They deploy deep into the enemy area to observe and report enemy dispositions, movement and activities, and battlefield conditions. They arc not equipped or trained to conduct direct-action missions..

PROJECTING COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY

Reason for creation of interim team:

Without sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic intelligence assets.

The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.

The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINT collectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's collection plan.

C2:

The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier. Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability. We can optimally have in the recce patrol 3 six-man squads, each having a CI soldier.

HUMINT OR MI BN IDEA

INTERIM COMBAT TEAM WITH ORGANIC INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO PROJECT FORWARD OF AO

Operations Battalion

Collection Management Section

Production Section ASPD & OB Teams

BDA & TGT Team

CI Team

Single Source Teams.

MASINT Team

SIGINT Team

HUMINT Team

IMINT Team

Corps Military Intelligence Support Element

Intelligence Support Elements

HUMINT Collection Operations

Combating terrorism support

Rear operations support

Civil-military operations support  OPSEC support

Information operations support

Civil disturbance support

Local operational data collection

Debriefing and interrogation

HUMINT threat assessment

Reconnaissance HUMINT Missions

Elicit information from the local populace.

Interrogate EPWs and Detainees.

Debrief Allies and U.S. personnel.

Document exploitation.

Threat vulnerability assessments.

Source screening operations.

Spotting/assessing for Tactical HUMINT Teams.

The early entry force, the interim combat team along with HUMINT/CI capability executes both an operational mission and intelligence endeavour.It shapes the battle space before the strike force moves in, makes conditions disadvantageous for the enemy in the initial stage , facilitates the arrival of the strike forces. It also conducts a preliminary intelligence preparation of the battlefield, makes a human terrain study and interacts with local populace using tactical questioning and elicitation to identify threats. In other words it helps in projecting the force into the new area of operations. In the case of asymmetric warfare projecting the force should be the case, not just deterrence. The latter part is force protection—is indeed very important, but if we have to uproot the enemy we need to be proactive, offensive and resort to projecting right into the heart of the enemy’s base.

THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Intelligence estimate. The intelligence estimate is derived from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (lPB). It is based on all available intelligence and considers everything of operational significance. It will help point out gaps in the intelligence database. It is from these gaps that requirements are derived. It will provide information on the mission, AO, weather, terrain, enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and conclusions. It will cover all of the standard OB topics.

In the Army at the Division or higher HQ level the intelligence estimate is prepared by the Intelligence Officer and his staff...it is instrumental in devising the COAs by the Commander. The estimate sums up the intelligence factors affecting the mission. It identifies the enemy’s probable COAs and the order of their adoption. It takes into account the Terrain and weather characteristics which might affect both the gauged intentions of the enemy and our mission and details the area of operations, the enemy situation and the capabilities of the enemy. The estimate is continually updated so as to keep the Commander abreast of any latest developments or changes in the intent of the enemy. This intelligence estimate is briefed at the Brigade/Battalion level. The intelligence estimate is predicated by the Intent of the enemy. Or Intents. The Staff Running Estimates helps each staff officer recognize and interpret the indicators of enemy intentions, objectives, combat effectiveness and potential enemy COAs which may counter the commanders end state. Thus the aim of the commander is to study the intents and devise appropriate course/s of actions taking into account several factors including order of battle, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, behavioral indicators, table of organization and  equipment, enemy capabilities and so on.(Order of Battle refers to the compilation of a systematic and methodical analysis of assets, capabilities, composition, and disposition of an adversarial organization, whereas TO&E refers to the organization table of units and associated equipment.)

To prepare this very important document the intelligence officer and his staff draw on the intelligence reports prepared earlier by the intelligence units detailing the terrain, weather characteristics and enemy strengths ,capabilities and limitations and the intelligence officer's conclusions about the total effects of the area of operations (AO) on friendly courses of action, the courses of action most likely to be adopted by the enemy, and the effects of exploitable enemy vulnerabilities. In other words we’re conducting a CAPABILITIES BRIEF of the  ENEMY Our MISSION is to develop an understanding of the ENEMY through the collection and analysis of available information, and then create an Intelligence product for dissemination.

These intelligence feeds by the units upwards which aid finally in the preparation of the intelligence estimate, is the result of tasking handed down to the collectors/HUMINT personnel by the Collection Manager. It is here where the intelligence efforts of the HUMINT/collector agents come into play which is governed by the intelligence cycle.

DERIVATION FROM ABOVE ..

1.MODULAR FORCE DESIGN : The resources and capabilities at the hands of the Commander with respect to intelligence assets are limited , sometimes scarce .From the above we can introduce the concept of ‘’Modularity’’ in force design. That is to say we can create a deployable, scalable, modular intelligence capability to plug into the requirements interface of any adjacent unit/company/headquarters who lack the necessary intelligence capability or whose resources are very limited. This modular plug-in can be tailored to suit the needs of the Commander of that unit. For example if HUMINT assets are more in demand than the CI or DOCEX elements , the former can be augmented to the plug-in by pulling from the parent units MI Company’s sub-components , with the Company’s capabilities not being reduced in any way. The MI (C&E) is a good example of a plug-in.

2. Tactical HUMINT team formed at company level from CI and I&E platoons of the C&E Company.( Please refer to the Appendix for further details on Tactical HUMINT.)

Production Section

The all source production and dissemination team (ASPD) in concert with the Order of Battle (OB) Team, determines if intelligence requirements and RFIs can be satisfied with its existing information and data base holdings. Information not available defines the collection requirements. The collection manager then tasks collection assets within theater or requests support from national level assets. These two teams determine what enemy information is available to help identify specific indicators of enemy intent and provide a current, integrated picture of the battle space. During the analysis and production portion of the intelligence cycle, the ASPD and OB teams coordinate with and receive information from the other production section teams. This constant exchange of information ensures single discipline reporting is fused into all- source products.

BDA & TGT Team

BDA and targeting team (TGT) performs target development selection and assessment. Based on collected all source intelligence, the team identifies target vulnerabilities, provides targeting data and nominates targets in accordance with the commander's HPT lists and the attack guidance matrix (AGM). The BDA/ TGT will also assess battle damage based on physical damage sustained by the target and their remaining combat effectiveness

CI Team

The Counterintelligence Team performs CI analysis. The team assesses the adversary's intelligence collection capabilities and operations directed against friendly forces, missions, and installations. The adversary uses many methods to collect information against friendly forces, including HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT. As a result, the CI analytical capability includes a diverse mix of specialists who fuse information to identify and isolate collection operations. The CI team and other elements of the production section exchange critical information required to analyze the enemy. Intelligence gaps and lack of holdings are provided to the CM section for action as appropriate. Specific functions of the CI team include:

o Develops and maintains CI data bases. o Monitors CI collection efforts.

o Produces IPB products to support CI operations.

·         Produces analytical products, including threat assessments, estimates and summaries

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

--not the same as intelligence estimate--

We have to conduct a counter intelligence study of the area of operations, so as to ascertain details about the enemy ,the existing situation , the military geography, weather, characteristics of the local population from the perspective of the enemy- that is to say who are the sympathizers, corroborators  of the enemy, where and how the enemy intelligence operates, how it conducts sabotage - terrorist- subversive and counter intelligence and counter reconnaissance activities. We must estimate the effects of Enemy counter intelligence and intelligence activities on our mission, operations ,capabilities and all steps that are undertaken to attain mission success. Details about the enemy must include[ in  counterintelligence context] location and disposition, composition, strength which should include local abettors and sympathizers, replacements and to what extent they are available, how much efficient are the enemy organizations that conduct intelligence, sabotage, subversive and terrorist activities. We must take into account all what the enemy counter intelligence services know about our intelligence and counter intelligence efforts. Historical, recent and present intelligence, sabotage, terrorist and subversive activities of the enemy should be maintained in database form which can be queried whenever required especially during mission formulation and counterintelligence planning. Those activities which are highly significant must be highlighted and all movements of the enemy during the conduct of such operations must also be recorded. We must know in detail the peculiarities and weaknesses of the enemy counter intelligence service and we must be fully aware of the operational tactical and Technical capabilities of the enemy as well as the type of equipment used by the enemy. All other factors must be recorded in fact sheets which must be attached to the estimate or recorded as annex.

·         After determination of the above we must now analyze the intelligence , counterintelligence ,sabotage , subversive and terrorist capabilities of the enemy.

·         1.. Maintain separate enemy capability data sheets, capabilities ranging from intelligence , subversive sabotage,  terrorist and those that adversely affect our assigned missions and operations.

·         2. Every enemy capability datasheet must contain information about what the enemy can do with that capability, how, where, when, in what strength the enemy can carry out its operation. The data sheet should contain information about the time the enemy can devote given the constraints due to our/friendly military security , force protection and intelligence/ counter intelligence operations.. The time when the enemy intends to start its activities should also be entered in the datasheet.

·         3. This counter intelligence estimate is made by thinking like the enemy and hence we consider all courses of action that can be undertaken by the enemy. Keeping these courses of action  in perspective we analyze each capability of the enemy. During this analysis we consider all the factors  in para 1, that is all the intelligence we gathered about the enemy counter Intelligence   service, existing situation, all the estimated effects on the enemy counter intelligence  service and Intelligence Service by the weather and the terrain and also the effect on our intelligence  and counter intelligence  operations and capabilities/measures, its strength, disposition ,table of organization and equipment ,local affiliations..

·         4. With all the above information  we now attempt to forecast the probable time of the most probable course of action of  the enemy. In other words we try to determine the estimate of the probability of occurrence  of the most likely enemy counterintelligence activity.

·         5. Every capability must be seen in the light of factors that will act as enablers or that will go against its adoption.

·         6. A capability must be seen in the light of its associated strength and vulnerabilities.

·         7. There should be a detailed discussion in the capability data sheet about all indicators  that point towards adoption of that capability by the enemy.

·         8. The data sheet should contain information exactly how that capability will affect our mission accomplishment—how that capability will be put to use, its role in the course of action of the enemy.

·          

·         The capabilities of the enemy should be categorized as intelligence capabilities ,  subversion capabilities , terrorist capabilities and sabotage capabilities. All known and estimated methods of operation should be recorded. Regarding sabotage capability all three that is military , political and economic sabotage should be taken into consideration. Both agent and guerilla types of sabotage should be considered. Subversion capabilities should include propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection and terrorist activities should also include information on enemy  cooperation that will help in the evasion or escape of hostile locals. Regarding terrorist capability we must have all data about the terrorist organization capabilities in the area of operations and also the capabilities of the main personalities of the organization.

·         We must utilize all our intelligence and counter intelligence resources to get information of all the centre of gravity of Enemy counter intelligence services, command and control , table of organization and equipment, areas of vulnerability and criticality of the enemy counterintelligence apparatus and whether or not this vulnerability can be exploited and to what extent or do we have to neutralize them. We must create a list in which from the beginning till the end we put down the enemy courses of action from  the most likely to the  least likely corresponding to each capability, and the most dangerous course of action singled out after considering all the possible courses of action. Finally we must put down all information that will indicate in an estimated from the effects that this course of action will have  on our assigned mission  or in other words we can say the estimated effects of the capability that the enemy will put to use to execute that most likely course of action to defeat our mission.

·         The final part of the counter intelligence estimate will now dwell on an analysis of our counter intelligence measures  to be adopted against these estimated enemy courses of action and whether there is any need of additional requirements or emphasis.