COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AND FORCE PROTECTION
PART-1
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR J&K UNITS IN LIGHT OF
THE RECENT URI TERRORIST ATTACK
Keshav Mazumdar
Antiterrorism Officer
As- Deg Military Sc,Dip Criminolgy
(Level A),HRC,CAS,CPO,ASC,CMAS,FNWMC
______________________________________________________________________________
Intelligence has two objectives:
First, it provides accurate, timely, and
relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding
environment.
The second intelligence objective is that it
assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence.
Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures intended to deny
the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence
also includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion,
and terrorism. Counterintelligence directly supports force protection
operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan
appropriate security measures.
Stated differently it acts as an early warning
system by attempting to provide accurate and timely information about the
adversary’s intention, and the surrounding environment. It also provides a
counterintelligence tool to deny the adversary valuable information and also to
combat terrorism, subversion and espionage. Thus intelligence is protective,
exploitative and positive in that it supplies us with positive intelligence
about the adversary and protects our own infrastructure. Intelligence thus
renders our actions either offensive or defensive.
“Intelligence supports the commander’s force
protection needs by estimating an enemy’s intelligence, terrorism, espionage,
sabotage, and subversion capabilities as well as recommending countermeasures
against those capabilities’’
Today’s war scenario is of the 4th Generation
type. Asymmetry has factored in most battle or tactical operations to a great
deal. In fact most of the conflicts around the Globe are asymmetrical in nature
, with the players in the combat environment being terrorists, insurgents with
very limited firepower , elusive and most of the time operating while mobile ,
very less identifiable with no conventional forces insignia , very limited
personnel strength , distributed and sporadic operational tactics, undefined
infrastructure logistical capabilities on one hand and a national power or
allies with a formidable military, attack and defense platforms and a central
military organization with subordinate headquarters and units spread at unique
identifiable geographic locations. Hence not to be subdued by this disparity
between themselves and govt. forces the asymmetric adversary
resorts to sudden, sporadic, hit and run type
attacks on the forces bases , installations , camps , ordnance depots,
communication systems, personnel and information systems with the sole
objective to degrade the forces combat capability and kinetic termination of
its key leaders at top echelons or middle and ground level tactical units. A
kill is a kill. A kinetic hit is a kinetic hit. Whether it’s a bazooka attack destroying
an armored personnel carriers drive system immobilizing it or whether it’s a
timed explosion resulting in the destruction of a combat helicopter in the
hangar , the end result is the same….we have lost combat capability. In this
fashion attacks on our installations,camps,bases,personnel and information
systems/communications are designed to degrade our capabilities, exhaust our
ordnance on nonexistent targets or dummy targets / proxy targets (deceptive
measures of the adversary) –this realm of Threat to our forces itself while in
transit or before deployment or in personnel stations and bases and the Govt.
forces actions to thwart these threats with intelligence feeds predicating the
plans/COAs design is called Force Protection.
CI
supports Command Force Protection efforts
by:
∙Identifying the potential threat forces and
multidisciplinary threat intelligence
∙Identifying threat capabilities and intent
together with the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of
action (keeping all the possible COAs parallel for review)
∙Using deception to mislead the enemy about
our capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions.
CI & SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:
∙Protecting classified information
∙Protecting critical resources
∙Protecting weapons and weaponry systems
∙Safeguarding visitors to the installation
∙Protecting dignitaries
∙Protecting Senior government officials or
military senior stafdf visiting the installation or areas outside the
installation but falling within military jurisdiction
∙Sustain mission objectives
∙Protect information systems
Within the installation thee may be specific
person/s,resources,assets,activity,operation or information that if targeted by
the enemy can adversely affect the installation operations , mission objectives
or any risk dimension—in other words it has ‘’Target value’’ to the adversary.
During security planning such entities should be identified (in most cases
using red-teaming or counterintelligence support to vulnerability assessment)
and secured against enemy actions. Include with this the need to ascertain what
adverse effects the local threat can have over the installation as a whole and
what missions or contingency plans can be designed to support the installation,
and what results is the minimum security requirements in the light of the
threat perceived due to the existence of local threat forces.
Local threat assessment usually provides a
threat picture specific to a single installation or grouping of installations
based on the threat factors mentioned above. This means that each installation
may have specific security requirements tailored to its individual assessment.
Resource economy-probably the most important
factor in inefficient Force protection
Due to erroneous planning, or improperly
defining intelligence requirements or even due to enemy deceptive/denial
measures it could very well be that the Commander deploys his resources, combat
power and other combat-related assets in the wrong place and time thus
exhausting/wasting them and hence resource economy is of prime consideration
during any mission and to this end the value of intelligence cannot be
overstated. These false responses can be limited and brought down to a minimum
by specific, timely and accurate intelligence. Intelligence helps the commander
to prioritize his security options. The commander can direct his efforts
towards the most important requirements, such as handling the most serious
security risks first, mitigate the threat/s which is of lesser severity and accept
the inevitable danger and be prepared for risks which are of least severity.
Thus the countermeasures will be more appropriately directed against the enemy
without any wastage of resources, manpower or lessening in combat
effectiveness. All this proper threat driven intelligence and
counterintelligence operations, the term ‘’threat-driven’’ assuming greater
significance as it then goads the commander to know the unknown aggressively.
It should be emphasized that other security agencies should be consulted and
information shared with them, both horizontally and vertically to get a
complete picture of the threat.
CI/HUMINT Support to Force
Protection: Whether conducting liaison, a Threat/ Vulnerability Assessment
(TVA), or a HUMINT collection operation, the focal point for most CI/HUMINT
operations is providing support to Force Protection. There are three critical
pieces to this support mission on which we focus:
a. Know the
Threat: The development of a MDCI Estimate is critical prior to any
deployment. Once contingency areas are identified, the HUMINT Single Source
Cell within the Control HQ begins developing and maintaining these
products. As the Battalion operational plan develops, HUMINT operation
management teams aid HUMINT Single Source in gathering information on the AO.
The turf is broken down and CI/HUMINT teams work to become subject matter
experts on the customs, culture, government, and geography of their given
areas. Once in the contingency area, conducting liaison is always the first
step. Without the initial preparation to gain knowledge of the area, the team
would be incapable of "hitting the ground running" and making the
initial liaison contacts required to quickly assess the threat to the force. We
look to identify and maintain contact with local police, intelligence, and
security agencies; Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO) and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO); and allied counterparts. Through this liaison the
development of CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) occurs. CFSO
operations provide Indications and Warnings (I&W) of potential threats to
our Forces.
b. Know your
Vulnerabilities: Once the threat has been established, the CI/HUMINT teams
move their focus toward conducting Threat/Vulnerability Assessments (TVA) on
critical army assets and potential enemy targets. The identification of
friendly critical assets is derived from determining what the Army Commander
considers as his centers of gravity and those assets that compose and support
it. Some traditional critical assets include C3 nodes,
logistics sites, aviation and ADA assets, and counterfire radars. The TVA
analyzes all the aspects of physical security, personnel security, information
security, and communications security. The TVA measures the current threat
capabilities against emplaced security measures and operating procedures to
identify vulnerabilities. Again, without the previous research in identifying
the threat and in conducting liaison, the team would be incapable of making a
valid identification of vulnerabilities.
c. Provide
Countermeasures: Providing valid countermeasures is often a difficult task
to strike the right balance of security with the given assets and environment.
Too restrictive of security measures rapidly degrades operational sustainment
and builds distrust in the people we are trying to protect as we
continue to throw barriers between us and them. Too lax of security measures
provides the enemy with his target of opportunity and forces the Army to pay for
a costly mistake in the loss of lives, material, and status in the world's
eye. Providing predictive intelligence coupled with valid countermeasures
is the apex of CI/HUMINT support to force protection. One tool that we can
use with good success in providing predictive intelligence is the
24-hour time-event chart. The 24-hour time-event chart graphically depicts
incident reporting on a 24-hour clock chart. Over the span of a couple days,
the chart displays the enemy's operational patterns. From this pattern, the analyst
can determine enemy sleep cycles, movement, and attack times, aiding the
analyst in predicting enemy activities over the next 24 hours. Countermeasures
can then be applied to avoid enemy contact on unfavorable grounds and increase
defense measures during most likely times of enemy attacks.
CI Does Not Equal HUMINT
CI and HUMINT , although sharing most of the
time similar collection techniques , are not the same thing in the sense that
CI is not a subset of HUMINT.HUMINT is an intelligence discipline whereas CI is
a multidiscipline function supporting HUMINT.We should not confuse the
information collection methods and operational intention. This incorrect
doctrinal terminology error will lead to a weakening of both/
HUMINT is solely concerned with collection , not
the purpose
of collection of the information or the requirements which predicate this collection. Yes the
HUMINT collector is aware that the purpose of his collection efforts are geared to
collecting information from designated human sources using specific collection
techniques. In this sense he is conducting a ‘’pure’’ collection effort, not
concerned with what this information will be used for and what necessitated the
collection in the first place.HUMINT collection includes “operations conducted using HUMINT
collection techniques regardless of the ultimate use of that
information.” HUMINT activities
include a great variety of operations, analysis, and liaison duties.
CI on the other hand uses human sources too as
source of information but goes few steps further in that CI is aware of the
intent of collection and aggressively uses specific techniques to either
neutralize or exploit the enemy intelligence activities using the gathered
information. Most of the techniques in his repository are similar to that of
the HUMINT agent; It is this use of HUMINT skills, particularly investigation and
source operations that has created the confusion. CI is a multidiscipline
function with the purpose to detect,identify,deter,exploit.neutralize the
enemy’s collection efforts—itseeks to counter enemy intelligence geared towards
terrorist,subversive,espionage,sabotage or insurgent attacks on our forces and
installations and lend support to HUMINT in its activities, protect the
intelligence cycle and ensure force protection—a very important factor.
Thus we find CI to be composed of several attributes,aggressive,never relenting
and protecting the other intelligence disciplines activities(for example ,
determining whether a source is a source who wants to wittingly give
information or is an enemy plant).HUMINT contributes to
an all-source visualization of the battlefield , increases the
situational awareness of the commander.HUMINT is intelligence derived from
persons,documents,a pure intelligence activity whereas CI is somewhat like the
hand in darkness..exploring,detecting,getting a hold. Moving ahead with all
help that is available in an unknown enemy specific darkness , the enemy
lurking in the shadows , whose actions once discerned by the hand will lead to
the latter’s firm clasp on his neck.
Hence we must not tend
to associate CI solely with HUMINT collection nor define HUMINT in terms of
CI.Commanders should understand this.It should not be the prerogative of only
intelligence personnel.Commanders,staff officers of operations etc functions
should understand this intelligence issue clearly so as to synchronize ops well
with intelligence.ISR effort should not be degraded by weaknesses in both
HUMINT and CI as a result of this confusion.CI and HUMINT are highly
complimentary. Very true but of opposing mindsets.
Conclusion
HUMINT collection and CI are and will continue
to become increasingly important as we enter the 21st century. Both efforts are
vital to mission success across the entire spectrum of operations. The
understanding of the doctrinal distinction between HUMINT collection and CI is
fundamental. This distinction drives the doctrinal description of both efforts
and our understanding of how they are mutually supportive and intertwined in
stability operations and support operations.
Whatever be the divisions in function or overall
structure, HUMINT and CI are indispensable to thwart enemy intelligence activities,
to conduct force protection in a optimum manner, to keep our forcescombat-ready to deliver precision strikes and to always keep
the decision advantage in our favor with the element of surprise by the enemy
being put at the minimum. Both disciplines are time intensive and inter-human interactions over prolonged periods have turned the tradecraft
into a very specialized skill involving human perception, behavior, psychology
and other traits. Unlike other disciplines like SIGINT,IMINT,MASINT,GEOINT
HUMINT and CI have in common human sources , the human element and hence is
susceptible to error , deception by the enemy , fraught with risks and
psychological stress including human vices predicated by money and other
factors which are usually the byproduct of information-transactions (quid-pro-quo).But it is exactly these
problems which prompts intelligence professionals to come up with newer tactics
so as to minimize these negative factors and the resulting exploration and
research in the field of HUMINT and CI leads to refined methodologies , TTPs
which have been found to be effective in many cases.
Improving Army CI Doctrine
The first step in improving the Army’s ability
to collect force protection intelligence is building appropriate doctrine that clarifies the role of Army
Intelligence and CI personnel. Make its information operations doctrine more complete by
publishing comprehensive CI doctrine. This doctrine should explain the primary
CI missions of collections, investigations, operations, and analysis and
production.
Doctrine guides the
employment of military forces, and shapes how military professionals “think
about the use of the military instrument of national power”. Army doctrine
details a basic understanding of the tactics , techniques and procedures to be
employed to support combat requirements. Air Force doctrine provides commanders
and their staffs a basic understanding of how various Air Force organizations
can be used to meet or support combat requirements.
INDIA historically lacked comprehensive CI
doctrine.This lack of doctrine has resulted in confusion, and hampered the
ability of Force commanders to use CI to improve force protection efforts.
Force protection efforts must be threat
driven.Vulnerabilities should be identified , the corresponding threats
identified and then protective measures are put in place.To this end MI and CI
play a very important role.This should be the basis for the creation of a
comprehensive CI doctrine. .
“CI is the systematic acquisition of information
concerning espionage, sabotage, insurgency, and related foreign activities
conducted for or on behalf of foreign nations, entities, organizations, or
persons and that are directed against or threaten our military interests.” To
this end a variety of HUMINT sources , like walk ins , casual sources ,
defectors , official sources , liaison contacts , recruited sources are
employed by CI elements. CI collections and investigations lead to a repository
of information on threats.Thereafter by cueing other intelligence disciplines
and using all source analysis a complete picture of the threat is obtained.Thus
we reach our main objective— the precise warning of hostile attack and we also
identify the probable targets of the attack and the time of attack.In a
nutshell CI usage of HUMINT is the first line of defence.
Army force protection requires a separate force
protection doctrine. Not only intelligence personnel will benefit from the
doctrine directly but also tactical commanders who must have a basic knowledge
about force protection so as to understand what requirements ought to be
defined and handed over to the intelligence and counterintelligence personnel
to adequately protect the force.
The commanders battlefield operating system at
his disposal are fire support and maneuver and here is where intelligence and
counterintelligence act as force multipliers –the Intelligence and CI BOS must be successfully integrated in the
Commanders BOS so that his PIRs are successfully answered giving him ideally a
perfect situational awareness about the battlespace so as to conduct operations
successfully. The commander focuses on the intelligence system by clearly
designating his priority intelligence requirements (PIR), targeting
requirements and priorities. Intelligence is a continuous process which keeps
IEW operations tied to the commander's critical decisions and concept of
operations. CI collection, analysis, and dissemination, like other
intelligence, have to meet the commander's time requirements to be of any use
other than historical.
They can then better
understand the limitations and capabilities of the CI support elements. Force
protection doctrine requires intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to
obtain and analyze information on:
∙Enemy units
∙Terrorist groups
∙Insurgent groups
∙Enemy special forces
∙Criminal enterprises
∙Cybercriminals
∙Radical elements
∙That part of the local
populace which supports the enemys ideals
∙Environmental/chemical/health/radiological/biological
hazards
∙Weaponry systems of the
enemy units,terrorists,insurgents and crimninal enterprises
Force protection doctrine should compel the
creation of Service capabilities to collect, receive, evaluate, analyze, and
disseminate all information on terrorist
activities,strength,capabilities,organization,intent,past history, current
activities in the area in question or areas of interest and indicators of
imminent attack.
We can categorize the threats based on intent.
This can be incorporated in the force protection doctrine. Hence we can
allocate HUMINT resources in an appropriate manner without any duplication or
wastage. Type 1 can be criminal activity geared towards army bases ,Type 2 can
be penetrative reconnaissance and sabotage operations, terrorist and insurgent
attacks , and Type 3 can be major land , amphibious , air and missile attacks.
TYPE1, 2 and 3 threats can be adequately
determined by the employment of counterintelligence assets which use HUMINT
sources to collect force e protection information and conduct investigations ,
security surveys ,threat and vulnerability assessments. Casual sources,
official sources, liaison contacts and recruited sources comprise the source
database of the CI repository. All source intelligence is also used for all the
threats, particularly TYPE4.These include HUMINT, SIGINT.MASINT, IMINT, ELINT
AND OSINT.Fusion of all information from multidisciplinary intelligence
platforms with data from national level intelligence agencies result in far
better situational understanding of the Commander. ISR synchronization is a
must if we have to have a robust advance warning system to avoid the element of
surprise.
We can make certain
observations after studying force protection failures from around the globe:
ØHUMINT was not given priority in force protection efforts ,
neither the HUMINT support was precise, effective and tailored to the
Commanders needs. Instead standard operating procedures detailing standard and
routine defensive methods and access control were implemented.HUMINTs
capability in predicting on how , where and when a terrorist attack might take
place was ignored.HUMINT can predict the specific target ,time and nature of
attacks.
ØLack of organic intelligence capability at tactical level.. “They
did not have a dedicated, organic, and focused [force protection]
intelligence analytical capability.”Plus there is a weakness in both collection
and analysis of force e protection intelligence. If intelligence capability can be pushed down to
company/platoon level with the soldiers being augmented with 2-3 HUMINT and 1-2 CI operatives (or the soldiers themselves being
trained in the basics like tactical questioning and interrogation) then instead
of sending request for information to higher headquarters the tactical
capability to investigate , gather information and analyze it would have been
achieved. The ‘’always top-down’’’ intelligence flow could have been avoided and a
four way flow implemented with interaction between the tactical units and
higher headquarters, adjacent company headquarters and intelligence
elements.Hence there is a desperate need for military units operating in high-threat environments
to possess organic intelligence collection, analysis, and investigative
capabilities.
ØMilitary intelligence lacked the necessary impetus to devote time,
effort and resources for long-term and mid-term terrorist threat
intelligence collection and analysis – such as trends, intentions and
capabilities of terrorists. National intelligence agencies were larger in
operational and administrative size and were given priority rather than the MI
in collecting intelligence but national level agencies cater to a wide range of
requests for information apart from terrorist threat to forces whereas MI can
exclusively set up collection taskings for force protection intelligence given
adequate weight age , administrative and financial aid and clearance by the
Government. This was absent.
ØThe installation in question fell prey to terrorist attacks
because the intelligence arrangement at Command level in higher headquarters or
at the installation headquarters itself was focused on outward attacks like
tactical missions, or defensive postures dictated by air
threat and totally
ignored the need for HUMINT/CI based intelligence collection for ground defense
of the installation, personnel, information and communication facilities.
To execute a CI operation successfully liaison
is needed with other civil agencies and with the intelligence agencies of the 3
services.To effectively build up a liaison time is required,it cannot be
achieved overnight.In case of COIN operations liaison is much needed with the
local administrations intelligence branch and with the police as they are the
ones who know the local area,population,criminal elements and insurgency
profile in terms of attack history, police records of personalities and elements
who have been apprehended and surrendered..the latter can be put to use by the
counterinsurgents as pseudo-insurgents to penetrate the adversary’s setup. Liaison
relationships are an investment in the future, and the return on this
investment is directly proportional to the time and effort expended on
developing and maintaining the relationship.
We can transfer say 2-3% personnel from the MI to the CI unit as CI units are generally
understaffed compared to the standard HUMINT units , and the liaison units.
Even transferring 3% personnel can significantly raise the strength of all the
units overall. Thus with this transfer the Commands HUMINT assets get a boost
and now coupled with CI augmentation the HUMINT teams can handle all three
types of threats , Basic , Levels 1&2.
Simply transferring will not suffice, proper
training in counterintelligence need to be given. But this wont be a problem as
the MI soldier already has basic intelligence training and acumen. Yes they
need to be granted clearance to access compartmentalized intelligence
information and hence prior to transfer the soldiers need to undergo a
counterintelligence investigation process as to their suitability.
The CI effort focuses on the overall hostile
intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive threat. The CI
effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the geographical environment,
attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of the supported command, and
changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive
organizations.
What Are We Protecting?
In protecting an installation and its
information systems, operations and general security from enemy
multidisciplinary intelligence threat we must identify the vulnerable and
critical areas to be given more weightage during security review. Not all
assets and activities warrant the same level of protection. To this end a
careful and thorough vulnerability analysis needs to be conducted resorting to
red teaming methodology.
It should be noted at
this juncture that it is always the attempts of the enemy intelligence service
to subvert our knowledgeable personnel. In a military production unit , say
ordnance factory , the senior engineers and quality control scientists have access
to sensitive designs and information related to weaponry systems. Similarly
classified and top secret documents/information are in the hands of cleared
senior personnel. These people are often the target of aggressive enemy
counterintelligence agents.
The five basic categories include the following:
1.People
2.Military personnel
3.Activities/Operations
4.Intelligence
collection/analysis
5.Sensitive movement of
operations/personnel
6.Conduct of sensitive
training
7.Communications/networking
8.RDT&E and sensitive
technology
9.Production of
sensitive technology
10.Protection of
nuclear/chemical/biological materials
11.Protection of
weapons, explosives, and equipment
12.Information
13.Classified
14.Sensitive
Compartmented Information
15.Top Secret
16.Secret
17.Confidential
18.Unclassified
19.System designs
20.System
capabilities/vulnerabilities
21.Sensitive methods
22.Facilities
23.Headquarters
24.Field
offices/administrative buildings
25.Training facilities
26.Storage facilities
27.Production facilities
28.R&D laboratories
29.Power plants
30.Parking facilities
31.Aircraft hangars
32.Residences
33.Equipment/Materials
34.Transportation
equipment/vehicles
35.Maintenance equipment
36.Operational equipment
37.Communications
equipment
38.Security equipment
39.Weapons
40.Automated information
systems equipment
Now that the CI agent is knowledgeable about
these assets and activities that need protection, he can execute a
vulnerability and criticality analysis and recommend suitable protective
measures as well as countermeasures to the Commander. He can recommend which
critical units need protection first and what resources to allocate and how and
where to implement general security and countermeasures.
UNIT PROTECTION:
We will define unit not be size or specific function
but by any military group capable of offensive, defensive or stability
operations.
Unit protection is the process through which
combatant and noncombatant personnel, physical assets and information are
protected from adversarial threats including adversarial multidisciplinary
intelligence threats.Multi layered, active/passive, lethal/non-lethal offensive and defensive measures are adopted for this purpose.
Protection is composed of a variety of active
and passive measures
(for example, weapons, pre-emption, and warning) in the air, land, sea, and space
domains. The goal of unit protection is preventing attacks on the three unit
resources , manpower, physical assets and information so that the capability of
the unit to maintain its fighting potential without any degradation by the
enemy is constantly maintained.
The Army must:
ØDetect the threat
ØAsses the threat capability to degrade the units combat
capabilities
ØDecide on protective measures , whether offensive or defensive
ØAct to implement these protective measures
ØRecover in very less time from any damage inflicted by the
adversary so that
technical countermeasures and tactical
procedures may be employed so as to bring back the unit to full operational
status in the least time possible.
In order for unit protection to be 100% effective we need to
ensure that the following are taken into prioritized consideration by the unit
commander:
vPersistent surveillance
vActionable intelligence
vPrecise target recognition
vInterrogation
vCommanders situational awareness
vAccurate identification of unit security related intelligence gaps
The above factors are contained in the Detect-Assess-Decide system.”(DAD).
In addition unit Command and Control must be
properly defined as C2 aids the Commander to take proper decisions in the light
of what needs to be done exactly to protect the unit and ensure that this is
carried out efficiently.
Protection: Protection is a function which
should be given a holistic treatment. Protection should not separately focus on
weapons deployment , pre-emption and warning. All three must be integrated. No
one is a separate entity. Protection must be proactive. In fact unit protection
should never always be passive but must also include active
measures.Intellighence , counterintelligence and an admixture of military and
cross government capabilities should be employed to the full. Installation/camp
protection should look beyond the perimeters. Just employing passive
measures(check posts, access control, perimeter security , guard functions ,
lighting) and OPSEC isn’t sufficient. Surveillance teams , counterintelligence
operatives should foray outside into adjoining areas , even areas of interest
located far from the unit , and the communities in these areas so as to gain
information/intelligence and counter enemy reconnaissance/HUMINT/subversive
/sabotage/terrorist activities. Counterintelligence should be
employed to screen
contract workers and suppliers. A counterintelligence review should be
conducted periodically on unit personnel. Red teaming should be taken up by the
commander and his staff to ascertain unit vulnerabilities and critical areas.
Add to Detect , Assess and Decide the functions
Act and Recover and we have the foundation for a complete protection system on
which to base our decisions regarding collection of intelligence , fortifying
and strengthening/hardening our bases, decide on the optimum courses of actions
, employ forces optimally to act on these decisions and in case of an attack
which could not be prevented , recover in the shortest possible time without
the base collapsing totally during/after the attack using redundancy
measures/backups and thorough protection of critical assets. We should also
remember protection has yet another dimension. The enemy might know the
protective measures we have employed using intelligence and might attempt to block
/prevent/deter our post-attack or pre-emptiveactions , hence protection must take these into account
also.
Protection means ‘’time-critical tactical operations’’
..not just tactical operations. Protection should be a 360 degrees
hemispherical capability , meaning protection from land , air and sea based
attacks.
For protection intelligence is critical as
everything needs to be known about the enemy , environment and self. The last
factor is determined by counterintelligence reviews , technical experts and red
teaming.All intelligence platforms and ops must be thoroughly integrated to
handle attacks fro m land , air, information , electronic,CBRNE,and
intelligence domains of the enemy. This integrated approach heightens the
commander’s situational awareness considerably , thus acting as a force e
anddecision-superiority enabler thus leading to
optimum effective course of action/s by the Commander with a decisive finish.
Thus it is clear from the above that protection
must be proactive , intelligence-led and an integrated approach.
Objectives of unit protection are:
Install a warning system
Intelligence preparation of all areas adjoining
the base ,camp , the route along which the troops movement takes place –in fact it must be made mandatory for units intelligence section to
keep an updated file on the intelligence preparation of the entire area
surrounding the base/troop movement route whether or not there is a perception
of threat.IPB should include , among other things
∙Protection must be
proactive , lethal and nonlethal both.
∙Intelligence is the
primary tool in protection
∙Increase active/passive
protection measures
∙Rapid seizure of
initiatives
∙Rapid transition to decisive
operations
∙Rapid decision making
capacity as tactical operations in unit protection are ‘’time-
critical’’.Damage to our forces in combat on the battlefdield or in case of an
assymetrical combat , in hilly/urban/jungle terrain but away from base is
different than that of an attack on an unsuspecting troop movement or
installation/base itself where an attack means catching us off guard ,
unprepared and things move so fast due to the element of surprise our forces do
not have enough time to recover , regroup and counterattack in time to thwart
the enemy.The enemy may have critical assets in mind when they attack the
installation/camp/base.Thus tactical operations are ‘’time-critical’’.Hence to successfully thwart an attack ,should
our defences fail …we must be prepared to execute time critical axctions
without falling prey to the shock due to the surprise element.This is more so
say in the case of an attack on an unsuspecting convoy or troop column.
∙Reducing vulnerability
to minimum
∙Identifying critical
assets , protecting them priority of all unit protection systems
∙Understanding that most
operations will be in a non-linear unconventional operational environment and
hence all intelligence , counterintelligence , surveillance , reconnaissance ,
target determination and nomination, combat oiperations,passive and active
protection measures , red teaming , and recovery options should be seen from
this perspective.
∙Should understand that a
complete 360 degree hemispherical protection system must be installed which
must be a thoroughly integrated intelligence and operations function keeping
the factors DAD in perspective and the factors which come next , viz..Act ,
Finish and Recover
The following types of threats should be
expected in any future conflict-
∙Attacks –air based/heliborne—on logistical systems.
∙Critical assets will be
targeted with precision munitions.
∙Staging areas , critical
choke points may be targeted using missiles with medium-range to ballistic capabilities.
∙Random attacks so as to be
unpredictable , IED attacks , terrorist and insurgent attacks and Special
Forces attacks may be conducted with twin objectives or any of
them..Viz..Effect destruction/undermine our fighting capability and to force
the commander to waste resources , ammunition, and unnecessarily divert forces
to protect facilities and personnel which in fact are not threatened.
We must remember we are
now facing a fourth generation enemy , who will attempt to put in use every
means including confusion and deception to overcome the asymmetry/mismatch by
increasing uncertainty and making us more susceptible to the element of
surprise. The enemy will resort to continuous , random, and non-decisive engagements. The enemy will randomly and continuously threaten and
interdict lines of cooperation’s and communications. They will use camouflage
and deception to to reduce weapon engagement rangers and degrade our forces
advantages in ‘’stand-off’’engagements.
There are two objectives herein—first to confuse us so much that we cannot execute the
targeting process correctly , target determnination.identification.nomination
becomes very difficult against an elusive enemy employing random attack methods
, and secondly frequent loss of contact with this elusive enemy has more
negative consequences than that which would have occurred with a conventional
more predictable echeloned enemy.
HUMINT and CI are two disciplines which help in
detecting enemy capabilities, intent and countering enemy intelligence
collection activities. In a typical Army Intelligence structure, the
intelligence assets are located at Div and Bde levels , with the Bde having a
HQ company and Intelligence Bn , each Bn catering to a specific
collection/counterint discipline. For example there can be a Ops Bn , a
reconnaissance Bn , a tactical exploitation Bn,a forward collection Bn ,or a
strategic SIGINT Bn.There is also a Div MI Bn and a theater intelligence Bde.
Military intelligence brigades coordinate,
manage, and direct intelligence and surveillance; they conduct collection
management, all-source intelligence analysis, production; and they
disseminate information in support of national, joint, interagency, multi-national, regional combatant command, and Army service component
requirements.
Unit protection must
integrate the protective attributes of different Army Corps. The capabilities
in brief of the Corps are as follows:
∙The Air Defense
artillery provides protection by acting as a warning system , intercepting
threats directed from air in the form of missiles and aerial attacks
(heliborne..etc) and also provide locational grid information for otrher
supporting forces to target.
∙Military Police provides
security by executing proactive intelligence led policing.
∙Engineer Corps protect
our force by contributing to its mobility and countermobility thus heightening
its survivability.provides the capabilities of survivability, mobility, and
countermobility to the force.
∙Military intelligence
provides security to our force by adequate synchronized utilization/deployment
of ISR assets and counterintelligence capability
∙Signals protects our
command and control nodes directing/controlling communiucation,computers,and
intelligence operations. Siugnals intelligence directly supports HUMINT
operations to validate information,increase the situational understanding oif
the Commander.
∙Field Artillery provides
security to the force by contributing to the direct/indirect
firepower,predicting impact points.
∙Ordnance Corp
contributes to recovery by deploying its ordnance disposal systems.
Unit Protection Functions
It’s very true that conventional military
threats exist and are given priority in intelligence activities but the
existence and threat capabilities of asymmetric , nonconventional threats
cannot be undermined. Add to these new emerging threats of this category. At
the tactical level it is very important to address this type of threat by
determining its identity, leadership, capabilities, tracking its location and
gauging its intent. We need to detect the enemy entire range of hostile
activity including intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities,
use this information to assess its capabilities and intent to arrive at the
common operation picture COP which brings to light the
relationship between the
terrain,enemy,mission,troops,time and the civil environment thus enabling the
commander to enter the enemy’s decision cycle, gauge its intent more
accurately, deliver warning to force s in the area and develop suitable courses
of action. After the asses step is over the commander moves on to the decide
function wherein an action is decided upon or any existing action is altered or
monitiored.Therafter the act function takes over where the course of action
decided upon is implemented by tasking the tactical fighting unit to deliver
kinetic.nonkinetic attack on nominated targets or passive protection
measures..all with the intent to protect the force. Protecting the force should
not entirely be passive in nature, the soldiers need to go out and attack
nominated targets so as to deter attacks or fail plans to attack our
installations.
ACTIVE MEASURES FOR UNIT PROTECTION:
Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the capabilities to-
∙We designate a stand-off area outside the installation/protected area and take active
measures to deny unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that area
∙Just like we have a C2
system with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a C2 mission with
respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be integrated
with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely
controlled lethal/non-lethal measures.
∙As for passive measure
steps should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement
inside a restricted area/protected area .Areas within buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition
depot,etc can be effectively protected by employing unmanned remotely
controlled nonlethal systems at standoff distances. Measures should be taken
with priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering a protected
military installation again using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems.
Physical barriers, both active and passive can be employed for this purpose.
∙There can be instances
of enemy fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence we need
to include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams
built up specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be
integrated again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out here
that all the passive/active measures success depends on a great deal on
intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the remotely/manned
protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to apprehend any
infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian
contractors. Or we can
effectively liaise with
the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up a mapping of probable anti-installation criminal forces operating in the area who could attempt to launch
sporadic fires or explosive attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the
criminal group’s affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence can help in
visualizing our vulnerable areas within the installation and then proceed to
identify the critical nodes which if damaged can stop the installation
operations altogether. This vulnerability assessment coupled with the threat
assessment and supported by sound OPSEC practices can give adequate unit
protection.
From the force protection perspective CI and
HUMINT functions:
Recommending countermeasures after assessment of
threat capabilities, operations, expected courses of actions, most likely COA
and most dangerous COA.
∙Threat intent
∙Identify Threat
leadership. Key commanders. Key lieutenants and area commanders
∙Identify threat C2 nodes
∙Identify threat logistic
routes
∙Identify threat social
reach, network, and contacts
∙Identify threat
affiliates in other criminal networks, enterprises
∙Identify threat
sympathizers in own area of control
∙Identify
political/administrative figures that support threat ideology
∙Threat attack /defense
operations location parameters.
∙Gauge potential
attack/defense methods of threat.
∙Recommend C2 setup to
thwart threat attack.
∙Estimate with reasonable
accuracy the expected time of attack.
∙Possible locations of
Threat listening post/observation posts
∙Determine possible
escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
∙Possible enemy IED
techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
∙Gauge IED detonation
methods/means
∙Gauge IED timings
∙Possible routes for
IED ex-filtration
∙Staging areas
∙Safe houses
∙Weapons and ammunitions
storage locations
∙Production facilities
for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.
∙Find out what
supplementary operations threat may resort to
∙Recommending countermeasures
to threat IED
∙Recommending
countermeasures to threat ISR/EW
∙Determining threat
indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire
WARNING
Warning. Once actionable intelligence is obtained
warning or predictions is disseminated in a timely,unambiguous,specific and
accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the existence ofd a threat and
subsequent disseminatin.
Warning is of two types:
(a)Defensive warn
(b)Enemy warn
In defensive warn after receiving actionable
intelligence about the adversary’s possible attack the installations security
is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be
digital/aural/physical or virtual.
In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact
through non-lethal measures such as interrogation or challenging an
enemy unit/capability that in case of persistent or continued enemy action our
course of action/s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent to
prevent the enemy from taking further hostile actions and also inflict heavy
damages. Thus enemy warn is a method to deter the enemy from carrying out its
intent if it hasn’t done so yet or to stop the enemy in its tracks..
It is very important that warning should be
unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific,. In addition to this it should be
actionable. Warning can be graduated , meaning the level of warning may assume
increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which may
indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily but is
conducting discreet operations/increased intelligence activity masked in the
cloak of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open hostilities.
WARNING SYSTEM:
The warning system must have the following
features:
∙It should allow for
redundancies in our act capability systems.
∙It should allow for
passive proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical
assets, command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of
the installation/.protected area.
∙It should provide a
system of integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on
our installation , its C2 and critical assets.
∙Provide warning of
threat intelligence activities.
∙Provide warning of
existing threat C2 nodes
∙Provide warning of
threat capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle
∙Provide warning of
threat logistic routes.
∙Provide warning of
threat sympathizers.,
∙Provide warning of
threats possible attack COAs
∙Provide warning of the
defense capability of the threat
∙Provide warning of
threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi
∙Provide warning of
threats history
∙Provide warning of
threat movements
∙Provide warning of
threat leadership
∙Provide warning of
threat detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.
∙Provide warning of
Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
∙Provide warning of
potential attack/defense methods of threat.
∙Provide warning of the
expected time of attack.
∙Provide warning of
possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
∙Provide warning of
possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
∙Provide warning of
possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
∙Provide warning of IED
detonation methods/means
∙Provide warning of IED
timings
∙Provide warning of
possible routes for IED ex-filtration
∙Provide warning of
Staging areas
∙Provide warning of Safe
houses
∙Provide warning of
weapons and ammunitions storage locations
∙Provide warning g of the
Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.
∙Provide warning of
supplementary operations threat may resort to
∙Provide warning of
threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire
Future Modular Force
leaders must be trained to
aggressively manage information and instill trust in the output of decision
support tools that automated systems provide. Other major implications include
adoption of a lifetime of education paradigm and the creation of knowledge
centers configured to support professional leader education. Leader development
questions include, but are not limited to-
(1)How do we develop
leaders ready to deal with the complexity of the contemporary operating
environment, threats, and interagency implications?
(2)How can we develop
more adaptive leaders, versatile in UP operations?
(3)How do we provide
collaborative, distributed training problem solving and decision aids that
empower battle command to support commanders, as well as staffs to advising
commanders during planning, preparation, rehearsal, and execution of UP
exercises and operations?
(4)How are leaders
enabled to know the terrain and weather and appreciate their tactical
implications for tactical concealment, employment of weapons, mobility, and
seeking positions of advantage?
(5)How are leaders
empowered to understand the operational environment as well as, or better than,
the threat in order to execute UP detect, assess, and decide functions?
(6)How will units enable
leaders to know the enemy, friendly unit locations, and their capabilities?
(7)How will units adapt
to emerging UP situations more quickly than an adversary?
UP is not force
protection, although the application of protection capabilities will positively
affect force protection. By integrating the protection capabilities outlined in
this CCP, a commander, and consequently, the force will be offered superior
protection abilities.
END OF REPORT
1.01 PM.
1.02 3-10-2016